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SYMBOLIC REPARATIONS AND
RECONCILIATION: LESSONS FROM
SOUTH AFRICA
Ereshnee Naidu*
INTRODUCTION

With the growth of the transitional justice field in the past two decades, the issue of reparations for victims of gross human rights violations
has taken center stage in national and international law and politics alike.
The right to a remedy for such victims is asserted in a variety of the regional and international human rights documents that have emerged from
the post-World War H period.' The 2005 Basic Principles and Guidelines
on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations
of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law (hereinafter "Guidelines") outline what such remedies
should look like, drawing on international instruments such as the UN
Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the international
covenants on human rights. 2 According to the Guidelines, reparations can
take the form of restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction, and
guarantees of non-repetition.3 Given this constitutive diversity, truth commissions the world round have recommended a variety of reparative mea* Ereshnee Naidu is the Program Director: Africa, Asia, Middle East and North
Africa at the International Coalition of Sites of Conscience. She is currently a PhD
candidate at the Graduate Center, City University of New York. From 2002 to 2007, she
worked at the Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation in South Africa
where she conducted extensive research on the role of memorialization and symbolic
reparations in transitional justice processes. The author thanks Tara Melish for her helpful editorial contributions.
1. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 75, 78, July 17,
1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3; Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, art. 4, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 2, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171;
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art.
6, Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art 8, G.A.
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(1II) (Dec. 10, 1948).
2. See Basic Principles and Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparation
for Victims of Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, G.A. Res. 60/147, U.N. Doc. A/RES/60/147
(Dec. 16, 2005), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/remedy.htm.
3. See id.

[ 19-23.
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sures that seek to provide justice for victims and to rebuild societies
emerging from conflict.
This Article considers South Africa's experience with one such reparative measure: memorialization. Under the broad banner of symbolic reparations, 4 memorialization has gained increased credibility as one of the many
forms of reparations that can assist post-conflict societies in coming to
terms with the past. Various truth commissions, such as those established in
Chile, South Africa, Liberia and Timor-Leste, have made recommendations
for symbolic reparations initiatives within a broader reparations framework,
noting its potential to contribute to processes of reconciliation, healing, victim recognition, and guarantees of non-repetition of past abuses.5 Whether
memorialization initiatives in fact contribute to these ends nevertheless depends on multiple factors. In particular, as the South African experience
suggests, such initiatives can be meaningful only if linked to other forms of
reparation and part of a comprehensive package that includes compensation,
rehabilitation, and increased access to health services and community reparation. Indeed, for most societies recovering from the aftermath of violence,
there are a variety of competing needs-of individuals, the collective, and
the state-that require constant mediation. 6 Initiators of reparations programs seeking to achieve some of the social, psychological and political
goals of reintegrating victims into society, rebuilding civic trust, and reestablishing equal conditions amongst citizens must take these competing
7
needs into account in post-conflict reconstruction and transformation.
Through the case of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), this Article examines some of the challenges faced by postconflict states in implementing truth commission recommendations, partic4. Within the Guidelines, symbolic measures such as commemorations and apology are included under the broad category of "satisfaction." See id. 22.
5. See

REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION, CONSOLI-

vol. 2, pt. 17.0, 2, at 276 (2009), http://trcofliberia.org/resources/reports/final/volume-two-layout-Il.pdf; COMMISSION FOR RECEPTION, TRUTH
AND RECONCILIATION IN TIMOR-LESTE, CHEGA! FULL REPORT, pt. 11, § 12.7, 1 4, at 40
(2005), http://www.cavr-timorleste.org/chegaFiles/finalReportEng/l I-RecommendaDATED FINAL REPORT,

tions.pdf;

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, REPORT OF THE

& REHABILITATION COMMITTEE, vol. 6, § 2, ch. 1, [ 13-15, at 95 (2003),
http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report [hereinafter RRC REPORT]; CHILEAN NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION, RETrIG REPORT, pt. 4, ch. 1,§ B, 11 1-3,
REPARATION

at 1058-60 (1991), http://www.usip.org/files/resources/collections/truthcommissions/

Chile90-Report/Chile9O-Report PartIV.pdf.
6. See Brandon Hamber, Narrowing the Micro and Macro: A Psychological Perspective on Reparations in Societies in Transition, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS

560, 560-88 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).
7. See id.
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ularly regarding symbolic reparations such as memorialization, and how
these challenges relate to broader issues of social and economic transformation. Part I provides an overview of the South African TRC, its mandate,
and the recommendations it made for economic and symbolic reparations.
Part II focuses on the extent to which compensation and symbolic reparations recommendations have thus far been implemented in South Africa and
hence some of the TRC's "unfinished business." Through a discussion of
the Freedom Park Memorial project, the Article will highlight how symbolic reparations projects can at times create contestation and divisions if
they are not adequately complemented by other reparations processes and
supported by broader socio-economic transformation. The Article concludes with lessons that might be drawn from the South African experience
by other transitional justice initiatives in the process of implementing TRC
recommendations, including those in the Republic of Korea.
I.
A.

THE SOUTH AFRICAN

TRC

Mandate

Notorious for its Apartheid policies, South Africa was a pariah of the
international community from the 1950's up until its first democratic election in 1994. Based on a legislated scheme of racial discrimination that
systematically dispossessed and disenfranchised black South Africans,
Apartheid permeated all aspects of social, cultural, political and economic
life in South Africa.8 Following increased political pressure from the international community and internal liberation movements, coupled with the
ongoing protracted violence that reached its peak in the 1980's, political
negotiations were begun in the early 1990s between the National Party-led
Apartheid state and liberation movements, a process that eventually led to
the nation's first democratic election in 1994. It was nonetheless the establishment of the South African TRC in 1995 that became the symbolic
marker of South Africa's transition from an Apartheid past to a peaceful
democracy. The TRC was set up amidst high expectations of uncovering
the truth about South Africa's hidden past and providing a basis for rebuilding a society devastated by racial divisions and conflict. It has since become
celebrated as a successful model for coming to terms with the past, replicated in truth seeking processes in countries around the world.
Bome of a negotiated political settlement, the South African TRC was
established through the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act

8. See generally NIGEL WORDEN, THE MAKING OF MODERN SOUTH AFRICA: CON-

QUEST, APARTHEID, DEMOCRACY (2007) (providing a historiography of South Africa).
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No. 34 of 1995. 9 That Act mandated the TRC to investigate politically motivated gross human rights abuses that took place between 1960 and 1994; to
construct an impartial record of the past; to grant amnesty to perpetrators of
gross human rights violations in exchange for full disclosure; and to provide
recommendations for a reparations policy aimed at rehabilitating and restoring the human and civil dignity of victims. 10 Overall the mandate of the
TRC was developed with a view to achieving the broader goals of promoting reconciliation, nation building, and the non-repetition of past abuses."
It was made up of three committees: the Human Rights Violations Committee (HRV), which investigated "gross" human rights abuses taking place
between 1960 and 1990; the Reparations and Rehabilitation Committee
(RRC), which was tasked with developing recommendations for reparations; and the Amnesty Committee (AC), which reviewed amnesty applications and was granted the power to provide amnesty for those perpetrators
whose crimes were politically motivated and who made full disclosures of
the violations they had committed.
The South African TRC was in many ways an important step forward
in the evolution of transitional justice models. Based initially on the Chilean
truth seeking model, it nonetheless incorporated a variety of institutional
innovations. It was the first commission of its kind that had legal powers to
grant amnesty to individual perpetrators and to subpoena, search, and take
possession of evidence to be used in prosecutions. 12 It not only took individual testimonies, but held special and institutional hearings. 13 It likewise
created a witness protection program and was substantially more resourced
than previous commissions.14 Most importantly, however, it held more public hearings than previous commissions, allowing individual victim stories
to become integrated into the broader national narrative.15 In these ways and
others, the TRC made significant advances with respect to truth seeking and
providing a platform for victims to share their stories.
Scholars and advocates have nonetheless noted significant limitations
in the TRC's mandate and the reconciliation discourse intrinsic to it. These
9. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act 34 of 1995 (S. Afr.),
available at http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/acts/1995-034.pdf.
10. See id. ch. 2, § 3.
11. See

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA, TRUTH AND

1, ch. 4,
(1998), http://www.justice.gov.za/trc/report [hereinafter TRC REPORT].
RECONCILIATION COMMISSION OF SOUTH AFRICA REPORT, Vol.

12. See
13. See
14. See
of the South
15. See

1-4, at 48-49

id. 26, at 54.
id. 28, at 54.
id. T129, at 55. For a detailed discussion of the uniqueness and successes
African TRC process, see id. 24-30, at 54-55.
id. 1 27, at 54.
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limitations have resulted in some of the challenges that South Africa today
faces with regard to issues of transformation, reconciliation and the realization of an equitable democracy. First, the Act establishing the TRC limited
its mandate to investigating "gross violations of human rights," statutorily
defined as "the killing, abduction, torture or severe ill-treatment of any person ...."16 As has been widely noted, this limited definition focused the
TRC's truth-revealing gaze narrowly on physical violations associated with
direct political conflict between state agents and political activists, excluding the pervasive and negative social and economic effects Apartheid had
on the majority of South Africans. 17 As Madeleine Fullard and Mamphela
Ramphele have argued, the failure of the TRC to grapple head-on with the
structural inequalities between blacks and whites has made it difficult for
the majority of South Africans to move on, as these issues continue to remain barriers to post-conflict transformation.18
The reconciliation discourse associated with the TRC and its mandate
has similarly made it difficult for many South Africans to move forward. 19
Various civil society observers and scholars note that while the majority of
white perpetrators received amnesty for full disclosure without having to
show any remorse or personal responsibility for the crimes they committed,
the burden of forgiveness and moving on was ultimately placed upon the

16. Id. 42, at 60.
17. See Mahmood Mamdani, The Truth According to the TRC, in THE POLITICS OF
MEMORY: TRUTH, HEALING AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 176, 178-81 (Ifi Amadiume & Abdullahi An-Naim eds., 2000).

18. See

MAMPHELA RAMPHELE, LAYING GHOSTS TO REST: DILEMMAS OF TRANS-

(2008); Madeleine Fullard, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Dis-placing Race: The South African Truth and
Reconciliation Commission (TRC) and Interpretationsof Violence (2004), http://www.
csvr.org.za/docs/racism/displacingrace.pdf. According to Ramphele, the differences in
the education systems, health services and other social services for blacks and whites
under Apartheid, has resulted in an unequal human capital base where the skills gap
between blacks and whites prevents South Africans from being able to engage as equals
working together towards a non-racial democracy. See RAMPHELE, supra at 14-15. See
FORMATION IN SOUTH AFRICA

also

CLAIRE MOON, NARRATING POLITICAL RECONCILIATION: SOUTH AFRICA'S TRUTH

(2009).
19. Some commentators argue that the TRC's emphasis on racial inclusivity resulted in an over-representation of white victims at the hearings, thereby distorting the
overwhelming impact of Apartheid on the majority of black communities. See TRC
Category-4 Reparations, TRACES OF TRUTH: DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE SOUTH
AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

AFRICAN

TRUTH

AND

RECONCILIATION

COMMISSION,

descr.php?cat=4 ( last visited Aug. 8, 2012).

http://truth.wwl.wits.ac.za/cat-
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victims. 20 In part this was related to the reconciliation discourse perpetuated
by the TRC. Based on the African concept of ubuntu,2 1 the discourse of
reconciliation was located within an African identity that placed a moral
burden on victims to forgive. 22 According to government officials who
work on monitoring the implementation of the TRC recommendations,
some of the challenges faced in realizing reconciliation arise from the number of political concessions the TRC made and its associated reliance on the
goodwill of South Africans at large to take further the reconciliation process. The result is that racial reconciliation has still not been realized since
the inequalities of the past remain unaddressed and the status quo remains
23
largely unchanged.
In particular, it is important to note the TRC's reluctance to address
directly issues of race and racism in clarifying the truth of the past. Under
an ethos of "non-racialism" and in an effort to promote racial inclusivity,
the TRC's enabling legislation is in fact devoid of specific reference to
either "apartheid" or "racism. '24 This failure of the TRC to confront the
connection between human rights violations and the racialized power relations in which they took place has substantially diminished its relevance to
the daily lives of ordinary black South Africans. As has been noted, the
TRC's work appears in this regard "sharply detached from the concerns
with race which have become the substance of national debate, media interest, court cases and disputes in the formal and informal terrain in South
Africa. ' 25 It is here, "around race and the economy and the cultural legacy
of racism," it has been argued, that the "more potent site of transition, the
real language of change" can be located in South Africa. 26 And, yet, the
TRC was substantially constrained from going there under the limits of its
mandate.
20. Interview with NGO representatives and former TRC Commissioner in Johannesburg and Cape Town, S. Afr. (Sept 2011).
21. The concept of ubuntu was popularized by Archbishop Desmond Tutu during
the TRC. The term refers to a mutual recognition of humanity in each other. It is in
recognizing the humanity of another that one's own humanity is enriched and enhanced.
See RAMPHELE, supra note 18, at 117-18.
22. See ANTJIE KROG, COUNTRY OF MY SKULL 109-11 (2002). Archbishop Tutu,
for example appealed to the Africaness of victims to take the moral high ground and
begin the process of forgiveness. He also pleaded with white South Africans to extend a
hand of reconciliation which was not forthcoming from many perpetrators. See id. at
109-11, 158, 286.
23. Interview with officials from the South African Department of Justice: Post
TRC Unit, in Pretoria, S. Aft. (Sept. 7, 2011) [hereinafter Post TRC Unit Interview].
24. See Fullard, supra note 18, at 30.
25. Id. at 44.
26. Id.
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In her examination of restorative justice processes and the role of victims and perpetrators in rebuilding relationships destroyed by gross human
rights violations, Margaret Walker notes the difficult task of acknowledgement and acceptance that is required for reconciliation processes. 2 However, she also notes that paramount to the restorative justice model is that it
places at its core the material, emotional and moral needs of victims, required to reinstall hope and trust amongst victims. 28 Apart from the truth
seeking process itself, reparations are amongst the most important mechanisms that serve to acknowledge victims, working toward the restoration of
their dignity and reintegration into society. According to Pablo de Greiff,
reparations give truth seeking processes a forward looking character since
they are linked to justice processes, serving to recognize the individual victim as a human being and as a citizen. 29 He notes that reparations can serve
the purpose of creating a renewed social contract that rebuilds relationships
30
and enables victims to re-engage as active members of the society.
In South Africa, the issue of reparations was at the forefront of the
truth commission process. Reparations were perceived not only as balancing the amnesty clause inherited from the negotiated political settlement,
but also as one of the most significant means of providing justice for victims and contributing to reconciliation and reintegration processes for victims. 31 Correspondingly, very early into the TRC's work, many following it
recognized that the achievements of the Reparation and Rehabilitation
Committee (RRC) would be the indicator of the TRC's success as a
32
whole.
While initial discussions around reparations focused only on recommendations for the government to pay monetary compensation to victims,
the RRC eventually developed a comprehensive and complementary set of
recommendations based on victims' expressed needs, national consultative
workshops, and inspiration drawn from international law and other models
of best practice. Recognizing that "without adequate reparation and rehabil-

27. See

MARGARET WALKER, MORAL REPAIR: RECONSTRUCTING MORAL RELA-

TIONS AFTER WRONGDOING

383 (2007).

28. See id.
29. See Pablo de Greiff, Justiceand Reparations, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 6, at 465.
30. See id. at 464-65.
31. See RRC REPORT, supra note 5, § 2, ch. 2 (providing justification for
reparations).
32. See KROG, supra note 22, at 165.
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itation measures, there can be no healing or reconciliation,"33 these recommendations incorporated five distinct forms of reparation: urgent interim
reparations, individual reparation grants, symbolic reparation and legal administrative measures, community rehabilitation, and institutional
reforms.

34

Under the RRC's suggestions, urgent interim reparations were to include a once-off limited financial payment to be made to victims with urgent needs, who required access to special services or facilities. 35 Second,
the RRC recommended that individual reparation grants not to exceed ZAR
23,023 (approximately US$3,000) be paid annually to survivors over a period of six years. Subject to the recommended maximum, the precise
amount of the grant would vary by individual according to a prescribed set
36
of criteria.
Third, the RRC recommended that a set of symbolic and legal administrative measures be taken to facilitate communal processes of memory and
to restore the dignity of victims and survivors. 37 Recommendations for memorialization initiatives included exhumations, reburials, and ceremonies;
the placing of tombstones; the building of memorials and monuments; the
renaming of streets and public facilities; and culturally appropriate ceremonies. 38 Legal and administrative measures were to include the issuing of
death certificates for missing persons, the expunging of criminal records for
politically motivated crimes, and the expediting of outstanding legal issues
39
related to violations.
At the same time, the RRC noted that various communities experienced systematic abuse during Apartheid. Community rehabilitation programs, such as national demilitarization, resettlement of displaced persons
and communities, skills training, and support for community psycho-social
support initiatives, were thus recommended to promote healing, to reintegrate perpetrators into community life, and to provide broader community
rehabilitation. 40 Finally, the RRC recommended legal, administrative and
institutional reform in the judicial sector, security forces, correctional services, education system, and business and media sectors with a view to
41
preventing the recurrence of human rights violations.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

TRC REPORT, supra note 11, vol. 5, ch. 5, at 174.
See RRC REPORT, supra note 5, § 2, at 93-96.
See id. at 94.
See id. § 2 (for more details).
See id. at 95.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
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Significantly, while the RRC noted that government had the moral and
legal obligation to pay reparations to victims-and suggested a concrete
implementation structure for the government to put in place-it recognized
that other sectors of society were also responsible for the implementation of
its reparations recommendations. 42 In particular, the RRC concluded that
businesses had benefitted materially and financially from Apartheid policies
and as such the business and corporate sector bore responsibility for reparations. 43 In recognizing that "'the huge and widening gap between the rich
and poor is a disturbing legacy of the past' and given the historic benefit
enjoyed by business," 44 the RRC made specific recommendations for businesses and large corporations to contribute to restitution programs for those
affected by Apartheid. 45 At the same time, in acknowledging the need for
all South Africans to contribute to healing and reconciliation processes as
well as the successful civil society initiatives that were already underway,
the RRC recognized the role of civil society to make positive contributions
toward reparations initiatives. 46 The report notes creative arts projects and
47
symbolic memory initiatives as key areas for civil society's contribution.
The RRC report concludes by noting that acknowledgement and the
recognition of victims and survivors is one of the most important factors
required for the country to move forward. 48 Significantly, it underscored
that one of the major challenges it faced in advancing the rehabilitation and
reparation process was the difficulty in distinguishing victims from nonvictims and making the distinction between politically-motivated crimes of
gross human rights violations from broader oppression that permeated everyday life in South Africa. 49 It likewise noted that many of its recommendations were essentially symbolic acts since they could never meet the
standard of proportionality or make up for the experiences and loss that
victims have undergone. The South African government's implementation
of the recommendations was nonetheless necessary to "signal a commitment to establishing a just and humane society in which human rights are
50
respected.
42. See id. chs. 5-6 (highlighting respective roles of business sector and other institutions of civil society).
43. For more details see id. ch. 5.
44. Id. at 141.
45. See id. at 143.
46. See id. at 156-59.
47. For more details see id. ch. 6.
48. See id. ch. 7, at 160.
49. See id. at 16t.
50. Id. at 162.
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THE IMPLEMENTATION OF REPARATIONS RECOMMENDATIONS

Agreeing with the TRC, various scholars argue that the actual granting
of reparations to victims and the processes around which the various forms
of reparations are made exemplifies the state's will to re-establish equality,
trust and respect amongst all citizens. 5 1 By contrast, the failure to provide
reparations signals to victims that democracy and peace are being built on
their suffering and fails to recognize their broad contribution to the process
of truth seeking and broader reconciliation and democracy-building
processes. 52 Despite a roadmap from the TRC providing guidelines for a
holistic reparations strategy aimed at addressing the needs of individual victims as well as the broader society, the government has demonstrated a
remarkable lack of will in implementing a comprehensive reparations program. Following the recommendation of the TRC, in 2005 the government
established a Post-TRC Unit within the Department of Justice. The unit was
established with a mandate to monitor and audit the implementation of the
TRC recommendations, reporting regularly to parliament the progress made
by various government departments in implementing the TRC recommendations. While officials within the department claim that substantial progress has been made in terms of implementing individual reparations,
symbolic reparations, and the provision of medical and education services
for survivors and families of victims, 53 implementation is still languishing
as of 2012. As Wendy Orr, one of the RRC Commissioners, has argued, the
delays experienced in the final reparations program have been the most
damaging aspects of the Truth Commission's work and threaten to undermine the nascent healing process the TRC may have facilitated in some of
54
the victims.
A.

Economic Reparations and Urgent Interim Reparations

As noted above, the TRC recommended that Urgent Interim Reparations (UIR) be granted to survivors and families of victims who urgently
required access to certain services or facilities. Such urgent reparations
should have been disbursed in 1998, with the release of the TRC's interim
51. See de Greiff, supra note 29, at 460-66; Hamber, supra note 6, at 576;
RAMPHELE, supra note 18, at 64-69.
52. See de Greiff, supra note 29, at 460-66; Hamber, supra note 6, at 576-80.
53. Post TRC Unit Interview, supra note 23.
54. See Wendy Orr, ReparationDelayed is Healing Retarded, in LOOKING BACK,
REACHING FORWARD: REFLECTIONS ON THE TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMMISSION

OF SOUTH AFRICA 239, 242-43 (Charles Villa-Vicencio & Wilhelm Verwoerd eds.,
2000) [hereinafter LOOKING BACK].
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report. The government nonetheless delayed a full five years, under the
claim that reparations could not be disbursed until the TRC's final report
was issued.55 It was thus not until the end of 2003 that the government
made UIR available to individuals who proved an urgent medical, financial,
educational, symbolic or emotional need. At this time, ZAR 50 million was
56
distributed to 16,500 of the 18,800 total victims identified as requiring it.
Yet, as Yazir Henry has noted, the delays experienced in URI payments
served to disconnect the testimonial experience of the TRC from the reparations measures, reducing "'the symbolic sense of the reparation,' and in the
57
process often doing more harm than good.
In 2003, following extensive lobbying and advocacy from various civil
society organizations regarding individual economic reparations, then President Thabo Mbeki similarly announced a once off payment of ZAR 30,000
(approximately US$4,000) to be paid to the 18,000 victims that had testified
before the TRC. 58 This amount was nonetheless significantly below the sum
recommended by the RRC, which had indicated that grants should be paid
in semi-annual installments over six years based on the median annual
household income in 1997 for a family of five. 59 Under this recommendation the average grant would have amounted to approximately US$15,000,
or roughly four times the actual quantum granted. As of September 2011, in
line with the regulatory schedule set out by the President for the issuance of
victim reparations, the government had completed payments to 15,000 of
60
the 16,000 survivors deemed eligible for compensation.
President Mbeki also announced his support for "community reparations," but insisted that they would be implemented as a part of a broader
reparations strategy that would benefit all South Africans rather than individual victims. Victims groups have nonetheless contested this approach.
According to Brandon Hamber, no reparations program has been granted as
a part of a broader development program. 61 He argues that access to im55. See Christopher J. Colvin, Overview of the ReparationsProgramin South Africa, in THE HANDBOOK OF REPARATIONS, supra note 6, at 176, 187-89, 201.
56. See id.; see also Matome Sebelebele, Grants for Apartheid Victims,

(Apr. 16, 2003), http://www.southafrica.info/services/rights/trc-reparations.htm.
57. Yazir Henry, Where Healing Begins, in LOOKING BACK, supra note 54, at 166,
172.
58. See Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act, GN R1660 of 12
Nov. 2003 (S. Afr.), http://www.justice.gov.za/legislation/regulations/r2003/2003r1660_gg25695-nat-unity.pdf
59. See Colvin, supra note 55, at 194.
60. Post TRC Unit Interview, supra note 23.
61. See Hamber, supra note 6, at 573.
SOUTHAFRICA.INFO
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proved social services was a campaign pledge by the ANC government and
as such more a right than a form of reparations that recognizes individual
harm and 1oss.62 In focus groups conducted with victims in September
2011, many victims also noted that it was government's duty to provide
services to all South African citizens and since services were not aimed at
victims alone, community reparations framed as service delivery could not
63
be classified as reparations.
Apart from victims' disappointment by the sum of the compensation,
the Mbeki-led government demonstrated a remarkable unwillingness to address or support victims' needs or to consult with them about the implementation process. As has been noted, the government has failed to engage
victims, NGOs and other groups in ongoing dialogue about reparations,
with justice ministers and other officials emphasizing that they are under no
obligation to consult with victims at any point in the process. 64 Feeling
abandoned and revictimized, victim support groups have in fact been forced
to file Access to Information Act requests to access the government's draft
65
policy on reparations.
The government's lack of will with respect to reparations has likewise
been evident in its refusal to move forward on the TRC recommendation of
a wealth tax for corporations and big businesses - a tax which was recommended to supplement the reparations fund. 66 Following the government's
unwillingness to address the role of the corporate sector as a beneficiary of
Apartheid, in 2002 a group of South Africans represented by the Khulumani
Support Group 67 sued twenty international banks and corporations in U.S.
62. See id. at 575.
63. Interview with survivors from Khulumani Support Group, in Johannesburg
and Cape Town, S. Afr. (Sept. 6, 2011, Sept. 9, 2011, Sept. 12, 2011) [hereinafter
Khulumani Interview].
64. See Colvin, supra note 55, at 201.
65. See id. at 202-03.
66. In August 2011, former TRC Chairperson, Archbishop Desmond Tutu made a
public call for a wealth tax to be imposed on white South Africans. He noted that while
all white South Africans did not support Apartheid, the majority benefitted from the
system. Most important to note is that Archbishop Tutu's statement received a diverse
range of public reactions, many of the discourses reflecting some of the underlying,
unresolved racial tensions that are still prevalent in South Africa today. See Murray
Williams, Tutu Calls for Wealth Tax on Whites, IOL NEWS (Aug. 12, 2011), http:/
www.iol.co.za/news/politics/tutu-calls-for-wealth-tax-on-whites- 1.1116744.
67. The Khulumani Support Group is one the largest survivor support groups in
South Africa. It was formed in 1995 by survivors and families of victims of human
rights violations and was set up in response to the pending TRC. See About Us,
KHULUMANI SUPPORT GROUP,

visited Aug. 21, 2012).

http://www.khulumani.net/khulumani/about-us.html (last
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federal court under the Alien Tort Claims Act for undertaking business in
South Africa during Apartheid. 6s While the case is still in process, it is
noteworthy that the Mbeki government filed documentation with the district
court and appeals court outlining its opposition to the case on the grounds
that it would discourage foreign investment in the country. In September
2009, the newly elected South African President, Jacob Zuma, announced
his support for the Khulumani Support Group lawsuit by rescinding the
government's previous opposition to the case. In February 2012, as a "show
of good faith," U.S. General Motors agreed to a settlement of US$ 1.5 million to be split between the Khulumani Support Group and twenty-five
69
South African claimants who were victims of Apartheid.
Despite a seemingly more sympathetic view toward survivors' needs
from the Jacob Zuma government, survivors are still faced with significant
official resistance in their struggle for reparations and justice. Since 2010
the government has been drafting guidelines for the utilization of funds
available in the South African President's Fund for the Implementation of
Reparations. 70 It has nonetheless been unreceptive to the lobbying efforts of
the recently formed South African Coalition for Transitional Justice, which
is seeking to revise the government's proposed reparations regulations such
that they are inclusive of all victims who suffered human rights violations
under Apartheid, not only the minority who testified before the TRC. 7 1
They thereby seek to replicate international best practices undertaken in Argentina, Chile and Guatemala, where closed lists of victims were re-opened
or ongoing victim registration continued beyond the immediate life of truth
72
commission processes.
68. See Colvin, supra note 55, at 208-09. For a detailed description of the ensuing
lawsuit, see Case Profile: Apartheid ReparationsLawsuits (re: So. Africa), BUSINESS
AND HUMAN RIGHTS RESOURCE CENTRE, http://www.business-humanrights.org/Categories/Lawlawsuits/Lawsuitsregulatoryaction/LawsuitsSelectedcases/Apartheidreparations
lawsuitsreSoAfrica (last visited Aug. 21, 2012).
69. See David Smith, General Motors Settles with Victims of Apartheid Regime,
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2012), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/02/generalmotors-settles-apartheid-victims.
70. Post TRC Unit Interview, supra note 23.
71. The South African Coalition for Transitional Justice was formed in 2010 and
is made up of civil society organizations working on questions of transitional justice,
lobbying for the completion of some of the 'unfinished business' of the TRC.
72. See Khulumani Support Group, No Cohesion without Reparations! - The
Strugglefor Inclusive and Comprehensive Reparations:A View from the South African
Coalition for TransitionalJustice (July 22, 2011), http://www.khulumani.net/reparations/government/item/499-no-cohesion-without-reparations---the-strugge-for-incusive-and-comprehensive-reparations-a-view-from-the-south-african-coalition-fortransitional-justice.html.
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Given the ongoing challenges that survivors have faced with regard to
their right to reparation, survivors have become increasingly disillusioned
with the TRC process, arguing that the TRC was a political project, implemented to appease the international political community.7 3 Such survivors
argue that justice has still not been attained, and that the government's negative attitude towards survivors not only contributes to their existing
trauma, but also possibly "pass[es] the pain from one generation to another. '7 4 In the ongoing struggle for monetary reparations, can other forms
of reparations such as symbolic reparations contribute toward recognizing
victims and reconciling the broader South Africa society?
B.

Symbolic Reparations

In 2003, President Mbeki agreed to the implementation of various
symbolic reparations activities, such as the building of memorials and the
renaming of public facilities. 75 In recommending symbolic reparations, the
RRC underscored their role in restoring the dignity of victims and
"facilitat[ing] the communal processes of commemorating the pain and
celebrating the victories of the past."' 76 While central to recognizing survivors and victims, the RRC noted, such reparations nevertheless should be
"linked with endeavours that improve the everyday lives of victims and
their communities. 7' 7 To ensure this end, the RRC recommended that survivors play a central role in all aspects of symbolic reparations projects, in78
cluding their design, building and administration.
Memorialization initiatives were of course already underway in postApartheid South Africa before the TRC adopted the language of symbolic
reparations. Several memorialization initiatives such as the internationally
acclaimed Robben Island Museum in Western Cape were created before the
publication of the final TRC report. In her study of the role of memory in
the daily lives of South Africans, Heidi Grunebaum argues that memorial
sites such as the Robben Island Museum are political projects that serve to
resonate with the ideological framework of the TRC, promoting and concretizing the narrative of the rebirth of a new, reconciled nation. 79 Such memorialization initiatives were in many ways necessary in the post Apartheid
73. Khulumani Interview, supra note 63.

74. Id.
75. See Colvin, supra note 55, at 209.
76. TRC
77. RRC

REPORT,
REPORT,

supra note 11, vol. 5, ch. 5, at 188.
supra note 5, ch. 7, [ 14, at 163.

78. See id.
79. See
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context, she argues, as a political tool to rewrite new narratives of citizenship and unity into the national landscape as well as to mark the new era of
democracy. 80 More recent memorialization projects are nevertheless increasingly being critiqued as divisive and elitist. In particular, recent memorialization initiatives framed as symbolic reparations projects have begun to
highlight some of the moral questions around race and racism that the TRC
left unaddressed.8 1 Questions of how the past should be remembered, who
should be remembered and what to do with memorials that may not necessarily reflect the values of the new democracy or broader citizenship are key
issues that may determine the success or failure of post-conflict memorialization and symbolic reparations processes.
A site that has been an ongoing source of contestation and controversy
since its inception is Freedom Park. 82 A national heritage site located in
Salvokop Tshwane, Freedom Park aims to celebrate all those South Africans that struggled for freedom and humanity. It is also the first major memorialization project that has utilized the language of symbolic reparations
in its mission. 83 Plans for the site include a memorial, an interactive museum and a garden of remembrance, all of which aim to provide new perspectives on South Africa's heritage. They also seek to challenge traditional
narratives by re-interpreting some of the existing heritage sites, such as
those celebrating Afrikaner nationalism. Important to note in this regard is
that the new democratic government did not destroy any of the existing
heritage sites. Thus, Freedom Park is built on a hill directly opposite the
Voortrekker Monument, an icon of Afrikaner nationalism. The juxtaposition of the Voortrekker Monument and Freedom Park clearly brings to the

80. See id.
81. In November 2011, for example, while the author was traveling in South Africa, a white South African man was charged with attempting to steal and desecrate a
statue of ANC struggle icon Nokuthula Simelane's who disappeared during Apartheid.
While the theft and vandalism may be considered a random act, the act itself highlights
the lack of understanding or respect towards victims and heroes of the struggle. Additionally, the public discourse around the theft and the consequent court proceedings,
again point to racial divisions and the overall lack of ownership of the new narratives of
post Apartheid South Africa.
82. Numerous government and civil society-led memorialization initiatives have
been undertaken in South Africa, especially at the local level. Freedom Park is exceptional, and hence the focus here, in that it is a national-level memorial project that
highlights reconciliation and national unity as central to its core function.
83. See The Company, FREEDOM PARK, http://www.freedompark.co.za/cms/index.
php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=l&Itemid=2 (last visited Aug. 12, 2012).
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fore a dialogue about the past and the present, but also works towards medi84
ating the Apartheid iconography of the past.
The Garden of Remembrance, a landscaped garden that includes statues and sculptures, commemorates and celebrates all those who contributed
to South Africa's struggle for freedom. It includes a wall of names of all
liberation-aligned soldiers that died during the struggle for freedom from
Apartheid. As a product of collective memory and a form of symbolic reparation, it is in this way like other memorials, essentially a political project
invested with ideology and meaning; it defines the boundaries between in8 5

siders and outsiders.

Correspondingly, in 2007, Afriforum, a local nonprofit Africaans-led
organization, protested the exclusion of names of former Apartheid South
African Defense Force (SADF) soldiers from the wall of names in the Garden of Remembrance. 8 6 The group argued that the roles and contributions of
SADF soldiers to South Africa needed to be re-evaluated. There were divergent arguments for the reintroduction of SADF soldiers into South Africa's
new collective memory. Some argued that they wished to "shrug off the
shame of being regarded as vanquished soldiers who lost the war and so
ended on the wrong side of history. '8 7 Others took the position that SADF
soldiers were victims themselves, claiming that such soldiers should not be
blamed for the system of Apartheid. 88 Others argued they were protecting
white South Africans against a communist insurgence and as such should be
89

celebrated.

Despite the contestation, Freedom Park management has argued that
Apartheid was a crime against humanity, declared such by the United Na84.

See SANFORD LEVINSON, WRITTEN IN STONE: PUBLIC MONUMENTS IN CHANG-

SOCIETIES 9-11 (1998). According to Levinson, the removal of monuments that no
longer reflect the values of the state risk evoking negative feelings amongst citizens that
may have a stake in a specific monument. See id. at 9. He argues that the state needs to
play a role in forming a coherent narrative that represents all citizens within a transition.
See id. at 10-11. It can therefore be argued that the choice of space for the establishment
of Freedom Park is reflective of the government's will to promote unity and inclusion.
ING

85. See JEFFREY BLUSTEIN, THE MORAL DEMANDS OF MEMORY (2008); WILLIAM
JAMES BOOTH, COMMUNITIES OF MEMORY: ON WITNESS, IDENTITY AND JUSTICE (2006).

86. See Gary Baines, Blame, Shame or Reaffirmation? White Conscripts Reassess
the Meaning of the "Border War" in Post-ApartheidSouth Africa, 5 INTERCULTURE
224-25 (2008). The aim of Afriforum is to motivate minorities to engage in public
dialogue and action "to ensure a future for us [the white minority] in Africa." About
Afriforum, AFRIFORUM, http://www.afriforum.co.za/english/about (last visited Aug. 12,
2012).
87. Baines, supra note 86, at 226.
88. See id.
89. See id.
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tions. 90 It has therefore stood by its position to exclude the names of SADF
soldiers but has agreed to include the names of SADF into its database and
archives. 9 1 The Voortrekker Monument has since provided a space for a
monument of names of all SADF soldiers. 92 Further, management at the site
has distinguished between reconciliation and recognition, noting that the
wall of names is a symbolic reparations project which is about recognition
and honoring, and not necessarily about reconciliation. 93 On December 16,
2011, at the annual Reconciliation Day commemoration ceremony, President Jacob Zuma announced the official opening of an access road between
Freedom Park and the Voortrekker Monument as well as a signed Memorandum of Understanding as a symbol of goodwill between the two
94
institutions.
The call for the inclusion of the names of SADF soldiers can be read
as representing the perception that Apartheid era soldiers have been
marginalized and need to be recognized as part of an inclusive society. Yasmin Sooka, a former South African truth commissioner has nonetheless
noted that South Africans should be warned against viewing questions of
human rights and rights of inclusion as value neutral. 95 The inclusion and
exclusion of names in this regard is by and large a moral question that rests
on the premise of those ideologies that supported the cause of freedom and
those that did not. Yet, the TRC sought to avoid these moral questions. As
the referential framework for the narratives of post Apartheid South Africa,
the TRC failed to identify a victor or the vanquished, drawing instead on
international legal standards related to just war principles. 96 Despite contestation that has played out in racial divisions, it is significant to note that
South Africa's history as a whole is a contested history that has been
modeled by the political elite, celebrating great heroes at the risk of downplaying the contributions of ordinary South Africans in the struggle for freedom. 97 Survivors argue that the current processes around national symbolic
90. Interview with Freedom Park staff member, in Pretoria, S. Afr. (Sept. 9,
2011).
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id.

94. See His Excellency President Jacob Zuma, President of S. Afr., Address on the
occasion of the Marking of the National Day of Reconciliation, in Freedom Park, Pretoria, South Africa (Dec. 16, 2011), http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=
5502 [hereinafter Address by President Zuma].
95. Interview with Ms. Yasmin Sooka, in Johannesburg, S. Afr. (Sept. 23, 2011).
96. See KROG, supra note 22, at 127, 283-84; RAMPHELE, supra note 18, at 52.
97. See Ereshnee Naidu, Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation,
Symbolic Reparations: A Fractured Opportunity (2004), http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/
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reparations projects fail to adequately recognize their role in the struggle for
freedom. Not only do sites such as Freedom Park remain largely inaccessible to the public, 98 but the processes under which such sites have been developed have failed adequately to include survivors in all stages of planning
and implementation. 99
Apart from contested questions around inclusion and exclusion, a major challenge with current symbolic reparations processes is that they are
not necessarily linked to other forms of reparations such as compensation or
community reparation.°0 0 As noted above, given some of the challenges that
survivors have thus far experienced with regard to reparations and justice,
many argue that symbolic reparations are only meaningful if they are part
of a comprehensive package that would include compensation for all survivors, rehabilitation and increased access to health services, and community
reparations.

101

Indeed, where basic socio-economic needs are not fulfilled, memorialization may not only lose its potential as a mechanism for recognition and
healing, but may also become a faultline for violence. An example is the
Kliptown Memorial and Walter Sisulu Freedom Square in Kliptown, a memorialization project designed to commemorate the historic drafting of the
Freedom Charter by the Congress of the People in 1955 and the early struggle against Apartheid. 0 2 In a 2004 needs assessment study, it was found
that given the town's extreme poverty and lack of basic services, the prolivingmemory/symbolicreparations.pdf; Ereshnee Naidu, Center for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Empowerment through Living Memory: A Community-cen-

tered Model for Memorialization (2004), http://www.csvr.org.za/docs/livingmemory/
empowerment.pdf. See also RAMPHELE, supra note 18, at 52-54.
98. In focus groups with survivors, many noted that Freedom Park was inaccessible both in terms of its location and entrance fees. Some also noted that while the
Khulumani Support Group was requested to submit names for inclusion on the Wall,
they were not consulted further during the process, nor were they invited to participate
in the opening ceremony. Khulumani Interview, supra note 63.
99. Id.
100. Pablo de Greiff notes that for any reparations program to satisfy the needs of
survivors, the program must not only be internallycoherent in that it offers a range of
benefits, but also externally coherent in that it complements other transitional justice
mechanisms. See de Greiff, supra note 29, at 467.
101. Khulumani Interview, supra note 63.
102. Kliptown, a town in the province of Gauteng in South Africa was the first
town of the broader Soweto township area and has historically been a place that housed
diverse groups. It was one of the first places where residents defied the various segregation policies imposed by the Apartheid state. Additionally, Kliptown was the site of the
historic Congress of the People that took place on June 26, 1955, bringing together over
3000 people from diverse racial backgrounds to protest Apartheid policies of segrega-

2012]

Symbolic Reparations

posed new development became a source of tension, exacerbating existing
divisions within the community. 0 3 In 2007, the Walter Sisulu Freedom
Square, itself established as a part of a government sponsored income generation project, became a space for violent riots, with residents protesting
the lack of basic service delivery. The irony of the protest and the space
within which it occurred is that the Freedom Charter, for which the site is
commemorated, emphasized the need for social justice, which is by and
large absent in the Kliptown community. Furthermore, the site as a space of
protest highlights the ongoing marginalization that the majority of black
South Africans experience, despite the fall of Apartheid.
The government recognizes in this regard that the major challenge it
faces with regard to the full realization of reconciliation is the need to improve the provision of basic services and the quality of life of the majority
of black South Africans who continue to struggle with the inequalities of
life inherited from the Apartheid past.104 Nevertheless, socio-economic and
structural change is slow to come. Survivors' frustration with their ongoing
marginalization and the lack of change in their quality of life, despite high
expectations following the advent of the new democracy, reflects more
broadly the frustration of the majority of black South Africans. Apart from
ongoing public protests related to the lack of service delivery and unemployment, the majority of South Africans have little faith in policies such as
10 5
affirmative action that were aimed to redress the inequalities of the past.
III.

CONCLUSIONS

Symbolic reparations may contribute to post-conflict transformation
and reconciliation. Yet, they may also create divisions and fuel ongoing
feelings of victimization. In South Africa, the mediated political settlement
and the consequent choices made by the TRC in framing questions of justice, forgiveness, and reconciliation have impacted the way symbolic reparations have been interpreted and understood. Reconciliation and
recognition as they relate to symbolic reparations projects remain fraught,
tion and oppression. The Congress of the People met to draw up the Freedom Charter
which mapped an alternate vision to the repressive Apartheid policies.
103. Personal research conducted for the Centre for the Study of Violence and
Reconciliation, 2003.
104. See Address by President Zuma, supra note 94.
105. See generally Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, SA Reconciliation Barometer Survey: 2011 Report, SA RECONCILIATION BAROMETER BLOG (2011), http://
reconciliationbarometer.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/201 1-SA-Reconciliation-Barometer.pdf (for detailed survey results of questions related to race, reconciliation, and
transformation).
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bringing to the surface some of the underlying tensions that were inadequately addressed by the TRC. Furthermore, the contestation around symbolic reparations highlights that not all South Africans have bought into the
TRC's reconciliation narrative. Questions of historic racial privilege and
bystander responsibility remain unaddressed. While symbolic reparations
initiatives may have the potential to enable the country to begin a dialogue
about some of these questions, the racially divisive discourse around memorialization initiatives thus far highlights that South Africa's democracy is
still fragile and that South Africans are still struggling to come to terms
with the past.
The TRC was successful in so far as it was able to uncover some of the
silences and distortions about the past. However, for countries such as
South Korea, coming out of their own truth commission processes, the success of the truth-seeking endeavor is by and large dependent on the followup process and implementation of truth commission recommendations. It is
a challenge for any reparations program to meet all of the needs of all survivors and, again, the standard of proportionality can never accommodate the
diverse kinds of loss experienced by survivors. Nonetheless, the effective
implementation of a comprehensive set of complementary reparations programs, guided by a policy that is informed by survivors themselves, could
further the healing process of survivors and aid their reintegration into
society.
Most survivors, as in the case of South Africa, welcome symbolic
measures. However, much of the success of these initiatives in fulfilling the
goals of recognition, healing, and reintegration is dependent on the
processes through which the memorial comes into being and how it relates
to other reparations processes. Part of the process of recognition is ensuring
that survivors feel adequately acknowledged and consulted during all
phases of a symbolic reparations project. In designing a process that is consultative, and placing survivors at the center of that process, memorialization initiatives can assist in rebuilding the social capital of survivors.
However, even these measures may remain meaningless if the socio-economic and development needs of survivors and the broader society have not
sufficiently been addressed. For many survivors, their survivor status is
linked to social and economic marginalization. For survivors, therefore,
coming to terms with the past is as much about social reintegration as it is
about social justice and poverty alleviation. Access to basic services such as
health care, education and overall economic wellbeing, enable victims to
reintegrate into society and enjoy the benefits and freedoms of living in a
democratic society. As Amartya Sen notes, freedom extends beyond the
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realm of civil and political rights to social and economic benefits. 1o6 Restoration of survivor's dignity, recognition of their suffering, and reintegration
into society is dependent therefore on the re-building of all aspects of life:
economic, social and political. While symbolic reparations may fulfill some
of these goals when properly implemented, inscriptions on stone alone cannot translate into a sense of justice or an improved quality of life, both of
which are essential for reconciliation.
106.
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